No Prices No Games!: Four Economic Models - cover image

Copyright

Michael Richter; Ariel Rubinstein

Published On

2024-04-24

ISBN

Paperback978-1-80511-308-9
Hardback978-1-80511-309-6
PDF978-1-80511-310-2

Language

  • English

Print Length

152 pages (ix+143)

Dimensions

Paperback178 x 11 x 254 mm(7.01" x 0.43" x 10")
Hardback178 x 15 x 254 mm(7.01" x 0.59" x 10")

Weight

Paperback373g (13.16oz)
Hardback585g (20.64oz)

Media

Illustrations13
Tables7

OCLC Number

1431223605

LCCN

2021388882

THEMA

  • KC
  • KCA
  • KCK

BISAC

  • BUS069030
  • BUS024000
  • BUS069040

LCC

  • HB135

Keywords

  • Economic Theory
  • Models
  • Prices
  • Games
  • Agents
  • Equilibrium

No Prices No Games!

Four Economic Models

While current economic theory focuses on prices and games, this book models economic settings where harmony is established through one of the following societal conventions:

• A power relation according to which stronger agents are able to force weaker ones to do things against their will.
• A norm that categorizes actions as permissible or forbidden.
• A status relation over alternatives which limits each agent's choices.
• Systematic biases in agents' preferences.

These four conventions are analysed using simple and mathematically straightforward models, without any pretensions regarding direct applied usefulness. While we do not advocate for the adoption of any of these conventions specifically – we do advocate that when modelling an economic situation, alternative equilibrium notions should be considered, rather than automatically reaching for the familiar approaches of prices or games.

Contents

0. Introduction

(pp. 1–12)
  • Michael Richter
  • Ariel Rubinstein

1. Equilibrium in the Jungle

(pp. 13–36)
  • Michael Richter
  • Ariel Rubinstein

2. The Permissible and the Forbidden

(pp. 37–64)
  • Michael Richter
  • Ariel Rubinstein

3. Status and Indoctrination

(pp. 65–90)
  • Michael Richter
  • Ariel Rubinstein

4. Biased Preferences Equilibrium

(pp. 91–110)
  • Michael Richter
  • Ariel Rubinstein

5. A Comparison to Game Theory

(pp. 111–133)
  • Michael Richter
  • Ariel Rubinstein

Contributors

Michael Richter

(author)
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5220-9995

Michael Richter is a professor of Economics at Baruch College, City University of New York and Royal Holloway, University of London. He is a graduate of the University of Chicago (BS, Math) and New York University (PhD, Economics). His research interests are in microeconomic theory, particularly decision theory, general equilibrium, and search. He lives in New York, with his wife and two kids. For other works, the author’s website is: http://www.mrichter.co/

Ariel Rubinstein

(author)
Emeritus in School of Economics at Tel Aviv University
Professor of Economics at New York University
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1574-2659
https://arielrubinstein.org/

Ariel Rubinstein was born in Jerusalem and received his PhD from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 1979. Has been a Professor at the Hebrew University and at Princeton and currently is a Professor (Emeritus) at Tel Aviv University and a Professor of Economics at New York University. He has served as the President of the Econometric Society (2004). He is a foreign honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the American Economic Association, an Elected Fellow of the Israeli Academy of Sciences and Elected Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. His 7 books reflect his research interests: Bargaining and Markets (with M. Osborne) (1990), A Course in Game Theory (with M. Osborne) (1994), Modeling Bounded Rationality (1998), Economics and Language (2000), Lecture Notes in Microeconomics (2005) and Models of Microeconomic Theory (with M.Osborne) (2020). His book Economic Fables (2012) presents his general views about Economic Theory. He created and manages the Atlas of Cafes (where one can think). All his books and articles are accessed through his homepage https://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il.