In this new edition of Foundations for Moral Relativism a distinguished moral philosopher tames a bugbear of current debate about cultural difference. J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, "moral black holes”. The six self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as online avatars and virtual worlds, lying in Russian and truth-telling in Quechua, the pleasure of solitude and the fear of absurdity. Accessibly written, this book presupposes no prior training in philosophy.
Velleman’s book is a very welcome addition to recent literature that reconsiders moral relativism as a viable moral view. The field of moral philosophy benefits from his willingness to stake out bold and engaging positions that neither conventional defenders of robust, universalist forms of moral realism or of moral relativism find comfortable. His choice of venue, Open Book Publishers, makes this work more accessible to a broader range of scholars and the interested public. His status in the discipline will hopefully influence others to consider a more accessible venue for their work.
David B. Wong
"Foundations for Moral Relativism , by J. David Velleman.". Mind (0026-4423), vol. 125, no. 497, 2016. doi:10.1093/mind/fzv166
I. Introduction
II. Virtual Selves
III. Morality Here and There
1. Kant Among the Sherpas
2. Aristotle in Bali
IV. Doables
V. Foundations for Moral Relativism
VI. Sociality and Solitude
VII. Life Absurd? Don’t Be Ridiculous
Bibliography
Index