Introduction
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1
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|
Chapter One The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, Phenomenology,and the Problem of the External World
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17
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1.
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Introduction
|
17
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2.
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Scepticism and SSK
|
24
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3.
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SSK and External-World Realism
|
27
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4.
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Phenomenology and the ‘Natural Attitude’
|
33
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5.
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The Phenomenology of Subjectivity in Heidegger’s Being and Time
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37
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6.
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Heidegger’s Response to External-World Scepticism
|
43
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7.
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A Heideggerian Critique of SSK’s Response to External-World Scepticism
|
47
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8.
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Conclusion
|
50
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|
Chapter Two A Minimal Realism for Science Studies
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53
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1.
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Introduction
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53
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2.
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Heidegger’s Existential Conception of Science
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59
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3.
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Getting at the Real
|
68
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4.
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A Phenomenological Reformulation of SSK’s Residual Realism
|
76
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5.
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Rouse on Heidegger and Realism
|
83
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6.
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Minimal Realism and Scientific Practice
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93
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7.
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Conclusion
|
101
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Appendix
|
106
|
|
Chapter Three Finitude, Humility, and the Bloor-Latour Debate
|
111
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1.
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Introduction
|
111
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2.
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Kantian Humility and the Thing-in-Itself
|
116
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3.
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Latour’s Attack on Social Constructivism
|
120
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4.
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Bloor’s Defence of Social Constructivism
|
122
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5.
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Where the Dust Settles in the Debate
|
125
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6.
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Heidegger and the Thing-in-Itself
|
128
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7.
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Putting the Bloor-Latour Debate to Rest
|
135
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8.
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The Humility of Science Studies
|
140
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9.
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Conclusion
|
149
|
|
Chapter Four Things, Thinking, and the Social Foundations of Logic
|
151
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1.
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Introduction
|
151
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2.
|
Heidegger on the Unity of Things and Thinking
|
157
|
3.
|
Heidegger’s Phenomenological History of Logic: Plato
|
161
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4.
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Heidegger’s Phenomenological History of Logic: Aristotle
|
164
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5.
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Heidegger’s Phenomenological History of Logic: Descartes
|
170
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6.
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Heidegger’s Phenomenological History of Logic: Kant
|
176
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7.
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‘The Argument Lives and Feeds on Something’
|
188
|
8.
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Time and Tradition at the Existential Root of Logic
|
194
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9.
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From the Phenomenology of Thinking to the Sociology of Knowledge
|
206
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10.
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The Social Foundations of Logic
|
209
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11.
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Conclusion
|
222
|
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Chapter Five Mathēsis and the Emergence of Early-Modern Science
|
225
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1.
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Introduction
|
225
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2.
|
Modern Science as Mathēsis
|
232
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3.
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Renaissance Regressus and the Logic of Discovery
|
247
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4.
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From Renaissance Regressus to Early-Modern Mathēsis
|
256
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5.
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Mathematics and Metaphysics at the Cusp of the Early-Modern Period
|
261
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6.
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Nature, Art, and Final Causes in Early-Modern Natural Philosophy
|
269
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7.
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Conclusion
|
281
|
|
Chapter Six Mathematics, Experiment, and the Ends of Scientific Practice
|
283
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1.
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Introduction
|
283
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2.
|
The Galilean First Thing and the Aims of Experiment
|
289
|
3.
|
Releasing Experimental Things
|
302
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4.
|
Boyle versus Line: A Study in Experimental Fact-Making
|
311
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5.
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Social Imagery and Early-Modern Science
|
328
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6.
|
Conclusion
|
340
|
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Chapter Seven Conclusion: Subjects, Systems, and Other Unfinished Business
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347
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Appendix
|
381
|
|
Acknowledgements
|
385
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Bibliography
|
387
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Index
|
415
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