Open Book Publishers logo Open Access logo
  • button
  • button
  • button
GO TO...
Contents
Copyright
book cover
BUY THE BOOK

Bibliography

Adams, F. and Clarke, M. 2005. “Resurrecting the Tracking Theories.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83: 207–21, https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400500111030

Alston, W. 1989. Epistemic Justification. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

Armstrong, D. 2004. Truth and Truthmakers. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511487552

Bach, K. “Statements and Beliefs Without Truth-aptitude.” Manuscript available at http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~kbach/Minimalism.htm

Becker, K. 2006. “Reliabilism and Safety.” Metaphilosophy 37: 691–704, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2006.00452.x

—. 2012. “Methods and How to Individuate Them.” In: K. Becker and T. Black (eds.), 81–97, https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511783630.008

Becker, K. and Black, T. (eds.), 2012. The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511783630

Beebe, J. 2010. “Constraints on Skeptical Hypotheses.” The Philosophical Quarterly 60: 449–70, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.635.x

Black, T. 2008. “Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58: 597–617, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.554.x

Black, T. and Murphy, P. 2007. “In Defense of Sensitivity.” Synthese 154: 53–71, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-8487-9

Blome-Tillmann, M. 2006. “A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society CVI: 383–92, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2006.00154.x

Bogardus, T. 2014. “Knowledge Under Threat.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88: 289–313, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00564.x

Boghossian, P. and Peacocke, C. (eds.), 2000. New Essays on the A Priori. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), https://doi.org/10.1093/0199241279.001.0001

Brueckner, A. 2004. “Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge.” Analysis 64: 333–35, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/64.4.333

Burge, T. 1993. “Content Preservation.” The Philosophical Review 102: 457–88, https://doi.org/10.2307/2185680

—. 2003. “Perceptual Entitlement.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67: 503–48, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00307.x

Carter, A. 2012. “Recent Work on Moore’s Proof.” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2: 115–44, https://doi.org/10.1163/221057011x560974

Casullo, A. and Thurow, J. (eds.), 2013. The A Priori in Philosophy. (New York: Oxford University Press), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.001.0001

Chandler, J. 2010. “The Transmission of Support: A Bayesian Re-analysis.” Synthese 176: 333–43, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9570-4

Cohen, S. 1988. “How to be a Fallibilist.” Philosophical Perspectives 2: 91–123, https://doi.org/10.2307/2214070

—. 1999. “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons.” Philosophical Perspectives 13: 57–89, https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.3

—. 2002. “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65: 309–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933- 1592.2002.tb00204.x

—. 2005. “Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70: 417–30, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933- 1592.2005.tb00536.x

—. 2010. “Bootstrapping, Defeasible Reasoning, and A Priori Justification.” Philosophical Perspectives 24: 141–59, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520- 8583.2010.00188.x

Coliva, A. 2010. “Moore’s Proof and Martin Davies’s Epistemic Projects.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88: 101–16, https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400802587317

—. (ed.), 2012. Mind, Meaning and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.001.0001

Comesaña, J. 2005. “Unsafe Knowledge.” Synthese 146: 395–404, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6213-7

—. 2007. “Knowledge and Subjunctive Conditionals.” Philosophy Compass 2: 781–91, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00076.x

Conee, E. and Feldman, F. 2008. “Evidence.” In: Q. Smith (ed.), 83–104.

Copi, I. 1961. Introduction to Logic. (New York: Macmillan).

Cross, T. 2010. “Skeptical Success.” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3: 35–62.

Dancy, J., Sosa, E. and Steup, M. (eds.), 2010. A Companion to Epistemology. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell), https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444315080

Davies, M. 2000. “Externalism and Armchair Knowledge.” In: P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke (eds.), 384–414, https://doi.org/10.1093/0199241279.003.0016

—. 2003. “The Problem of Armchair Knowledge.” In: S. Nuccetelli (ed.), 23–55.

—. 2004. “Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission and Easy Knowledge.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78: 213–45, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00122.x

—. 2009. “Two Purposes of Arguing and Two Epistemic Projects.” In: I. Ravenscroft (ed.), 337–83, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.003.0015

DeRose, K. 1995. “Solving the Skeptical Problem.” The Philosophical Review 104: 1–52, https://doi.org/10.2307/2186011

—. 2011. “Insensitivity is Back, Baby!” Philosophical Perspectives 24: 161–87, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00189.x

Dodd, D. and Zardini, E. (eds.), 2014. Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001

Dretske, F. 1970. “Epistemic Operators.” The Journal of Philosophy 67: 1007–23, https://doi.org/10.2307/2024710

—. 1971. “Conclusive Reasons.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49: 1–22, https://doi.org/10.1080/00048407112341001

—. 2000. “Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60: 591–606, https://doi.org/10.2307/2653817

—. 2005a. “The Case against Closure.” In: M. Steup and E. Sosa (eds.), 13–25.

—. 2005b. “Reply to Hawthorne.” In: M. Steup and E. Sosa (eds.), 43–46.

Duff, A., Farmer, L., Marshall, S., and Tadros, V. 2007. The Trial on Trial, Vol. 3: Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial (Oxford: Hart), https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472564153

Enoch, D., Spectre, L., and Fisher, T. 2012. “Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge.”Philosophy and Public Affairs 40: 197–224, https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12000

Fantl, J. 2012. “Knowlege How.” In: E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/

Field, H. 1994. “Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse.” Philosophical Review 103: 405–52, https://doi.org/10.2307/2185788

Fumerton, R. 2000/2010. “Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.” In: E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/

Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. 2005. “The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for your Epistemic Enemies.” Philosophical Studies 124: 331–52, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-7779-8

—. (eds.), 2007. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 2. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Gettier, E. 1963. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23: 121–23, https://doi.org/10.2307/3326922

Goldberg, S. (ed.), 2007. Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. (Oxford: Clarendon).

Goldman, A. 1976. “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.” The Journal of Philosophy 73: 771–91, https://doi.org/10.2307/2025679

—. 1979. “What is Justified Belief?” In: G. Pappas (ed.), 1–23, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_1

—. 1983. “Philosophical Explanations by Robert Nozick.” The Philosophical Review 92: 81–88, https://doi.org/10.2307/2184523

Goldman, A., and E. Olsson. 2009. “Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.” In: A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. Pritchard, (eds.), 19–41, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0002

Greco, J. 2007. “Worries about Pritchard’s Safety.” Synthese 158: 299–302, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9040-1

Greenough, P. and Pritchard, D. (eds.), 2009. Williamson on Knowledge. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.001.0001

Haddock, A., Millar A., and Pritchard, D. (eds.), 2009. Epistemic Value. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001

Harman, G. 1986. Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

—. 2010. Epistemological self-profile, originally entitled “Epistemology as Methodology.” In: J. Dancy, E. Sosa, and M. Steup (eds.), 152–56.

Hawthorne, J. 2002. “Deeply Contingent A Priori Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65: 247–69, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00201.x

—. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. (Oxford: Clarendon), https://doi.org/10.1093/0199269556.001.0001

—. 2005. “The Case for Closure.” In: M. Steup and E. Sosa (eds.), 26–42.

—. 2007. “A Priority and Externalism.” In: S. Goldberg (ed.), 20118.

Hawthorne, J. and Stanley, J. 2008. “Knowledge and Action.” The Journal of Philosophy 105: 571–90, https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20081051022

Heller, M. 1999. “Relevant Alternatives and Closure.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77: 196–208, https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409912348941

Hempel, C. 1945. “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation.” Mind 54: 1–26, 97–121, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/liv.213.1, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/liv.214.97

Holliday, W. 2014. “Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 44: 1–62, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-013-9306-2

Hudson, H. 2007. “Safety.” Analysis 67: 299–301, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/67.4.299

Huemer, M. 2001. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield).

—. 2006. “Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition.” American Philosophical Quarterly 43: 147–58.

—. 2007. “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74: 30–55, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00002.x

Jackson, F. 1987. Conditionals. (Oxford: Blackwell).

Klein, P. 1995. “Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails.” Philosophical Topics 23: 213–36, https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics19952315

—. 2004. “Closure Matters: Academic Skepticism and Easy Knowledge.” Philosophical Issues 14: 165–84, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00026.x

—. 2008. “Useful False Beliefs.” In: Q. Smith (ed.), 25–61, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.003.0003

Korcz, K. 2006. “The Epistemic Basing Relation.” In: E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/basing-epistemic/

Kripke, S. 2011. “Nozick on Knowledge.” In: Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Vol. 1. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 161–224, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730155.003.0007

Kvanvig, J. 2006. “Closure Principles.” Philosophy Compass 1: 256–67, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00027.x

Lasonen-Aarnio, M. 2008. “Single Premise Deduction and Risk.” Philosophical Studies 141: 157–73, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9157-1

Lehrer, K. 1965. “Knowledge, Truth and Evidence.” Analysis 25: 168–75, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/25.5.168

Lewis, D. 1979. “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow.” Nous 13: 455–76, https://doi.org/10.2307/2215339

—. 1996. “Elusive Knowledge.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 549–67, https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409612347521

Luper-Foy, S. (ed.), 1987. The Possibility of Knowledge. (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield).

McDowell, J. 1982. “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge.” Proceedings of the British Academy 68: 455–79.

—. 1986. “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space.” In: P. Pettit and J. McDowell (eds.), 137–68.

McGlynn, A. 2014. “On Epistemic Alchemy.” In: D. Dodd and E. Zardini (eds.), 173–89, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.003.0009

Manley, D. 2007. “Safety, Content, Apriority, Self-Knowledge.” The Journal of Philosophy 104: 403–23, https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2007104813

Markie, P. 2005. “Easy Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70: 406–16, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00535.x

Martin, R. 1983. “Tracking Nozick’s Skeptic: A Better Method.” Analysis 43: 28–33, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/43.1.28

Moore, G. 1939. “Proof of an External World.” Proceedings of the British Academy 25: 273–300.

Moretti, L. 2012. “Wright, Okasha and Chandler on Transmission Failure.” Synthese 184: 217–34, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9771-x

Moretti, L. and, T. 2013. “Transmission of Justification and Warrant.” In: E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/transmission-justification-warrant/

Moser, P. (ed.), 2002. The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. (Oxford University Press USA), https://doi.org/10.1093/0195130057.001.0001

Moyal-Sharrock, D. and Brenner, W. (eds.), 2005. Investigating On Certainty: Essays on Wittgenstein’s Last Work. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230505346

Murphy, P. 2006. “A Strategy for Assessing Closure.” Erkenntnis 65: 365–83, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9009-y

Neta, R. and Rohrbaugh, G. 2004. “Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85: 396–406, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00207.x

Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press).

Nuccetelli, S. (ed.), 2003. New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

Nuccetelli, S. and Seay, G. (eds.), 2007. Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Okasha, S. 2004. “Wright on the Transmission of Support: a Bayesian Analysis.” Analysis 64: 139–46, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/64.2.139

Olsson, E. 2003/2012. “Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification.” In: E. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/

Pappas, G. (ed.), 1979. Justification and Knowledge. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5

Pardo, M. 2010. “The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof.” Legal Theory 16: 37–57, https://doi.org/10.1017/s1352325210000054

. 2011. “More On The Gettier Problem And Legal Proof: Unsafe Nonknowledge Does Not Mean That Knowledge Must Be Safe.” Legal Theory 17: 7580, https://doi.org/10.1017/s135232521100005x

Peacocke, C. 1986. Thoughts: An Essay on Content. (Oxford: Blackwell).

—. 1999. Being Known. (Oxford: Clarendon), https://doi.org/10.1093/0198238606.001.0001

—. 2003. The Realm of Reason. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), https://doi.org/10.1093/0199270724.001.0001

Pérez Otero, M. 2013. “Purposes of Reasoning and (a New Vindication of) Moore’s Proof of an External World.” Synthese 190: 4181–200, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0256-6

Pettit, P. and McDowell, J. (eds.), 1986. Subject, Thought and Context. (Oxford: Clarendon).

Plantinga, A. 1993. Warrant: The Current Debate. (New York: Oxford University Press), https://doi.org/10.1093/0195078624.001.0001

Pollock, J. 1986. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield).

Pritchard, D. 2005a. “Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-scepticism.” In: D. Moyal-Sharrock and W. Brenner (eds.), 189–224, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230505346_11

—. 2005b. Epistemic Luck. (Oxford: Clarendon), https://doi.org/10.1093/019928038x.001.0001

—. 2009. “Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?” Journal of Philosophical Research 34: 33–45, https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr_2009_2

Pritchard, D. and Turri, J. 2007/2012. “The Value of Knowledge.” In: E. Zalta, (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/

Pryor, J. 2000. “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.” Nous 34: 517–49, https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00277

—. 2001. “Highlights of Recent Epistemology.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52: 95–124, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/52.1.95

—. 2004. “What’s Wrong with Moore’s Argument?” Philosophical Issues 14: 349–78, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00034.x

—. 2012. “When Warrant Transmits.” In: A. Coliva (ed.), 269–303, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.003.0011

—. 2013. “Problems for Credulism.” In: C. Tucker (ed.), 89–132, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.003.0005

—. “Uncertainty and Undermining.” MS available at: http://www.jimpryor.net/research/papers/Uncertainty.pdf

Putnam, H. 1981. Reason, Truth, And History. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511625398

Ravenscroft, I. (ed.), 2009. Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.001.0001

Raz, J. 1978. “Reasons for Action, Decisions, and Norms.” In: J. Raz (ed.), Practical Reasoning. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

—. 1999. Practical Reason and Norms. (2nd edn.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198268345.001.0001

—. 2002. Engaging Reason. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), https://doi.org/10.1093/0199248001.001.0001

Reisner, A. and Steglich-Petersen, A. (eds.), 2011. Reasons for Belief. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511977206

Roush, S. 2005. Tracking Truth. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), https://doi.org/10.1093/0199274738.001.0001

—. 2010. “Closure on Skepticism.” Journal of Philosophy Volume CVII: 243–56, https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2010107518

—. 2012. “Sensitivity and Closure.” In: K. Becker and T. Black (eds.), 242–68, https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511783630.019

Rysiew, P. 2007. “Epistemic Contextualism.” In: E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contextualism-epistemology/

Sainsbury, M. 1997. “Easy Possibilities.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57: 907–19, https://doi.org/10.2307/2953809

Schaffer, J. 2003. “Perceptual Knowledge Derailed.” Philosophical Studies 112: 31–45, https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1022590626235

Schiffer, S. 2004. “Skepticism and the Vagaries of Justified Belief” Philosophical Studies 119: 161–84, https://doi.org/10.1023/b:phil.0000029355.63475.9d

Siegel, S. 2005/2010. In: E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-contents/

Silins, N. 2005. “Transmission Failure Failure.” Philosophical Studies 126: 71–102, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-4541-1

—. 2007. “Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic.” In: T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), 108–40.

Smith, M. 2009. “Transmission Failure Explained.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79:164–89, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00270.x

Smith, Q. (ed.) 2008. Epistemology: New Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press) https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.003.0005

Sosa, E. 1999. “How Must Knowledge be Modally Related to What is Known?” Philosophical Topics 26: 373–84, https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics1999261/229

—. 2000. “Skepticism and Contextualism.” Philosophical Issues 10: 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-2237.2000.tb00002.x

—. 2002. “Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge.” In: P. Moser (ed.), 264–86, https://doi.org/10.1093/0195130057.003.0009

—. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology, Vol. 1. (Oxford: Clarendon), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.003.0002

—. 2009. Reflective Knowledge, Vol. 2. (Oxford: Clarendon), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217250.001.0001

Stalnaker, R. 1984. Inquiry. (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books).

Steup, M. and Sosa, E. (eds.), 2005. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. (Wiley-Blackwell).

Stine, G. 1976. “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure.” Philosophical Studies 29: 249–61, https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00411885

Tucker, C. 2010. “When Transmission Fails.” The Philosophical Review 119: 497–529, https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2010-012

—. 2013a. Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. (Oxford University Press USA), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.001.0001

—. 2013b. “The Dangers of Using Safety to Explain Transmission Failure: A Reply to Martin Smith.” Episteme 9: 393–406, https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.24

Van Cleve, J. 2011. “Sosa on Easy Knowledge and the Problem of the Criterion.” Philosophical Studies 153: 19-28, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9647-4

—. (ed.), 2013c. Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.001.0001

Vogel, J. 1987. “Tracking, Closure, and Inductive Knowledge.” In: S. Luper-Foy (ed.), 197–215.

—. 1999. “The New Relevant Alternatives Theory.” Philosophical Perspectives 13: 155–80, https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.8

Warfield, T. 2004. “When Epistemic Closure Does and Does Not Fail: A Lesson From the History of Epistemology.” Analysis 64: 35–41, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/64.1.35

Wedgwood, R. 2011. “Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Processes.” In: A. Reisner and A. Steglich-Petersen (eds.), 180–200, https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511977206.011

—. 2013. A Priori Bootstrapping.” In: A. Casullo and J. Thurow (eds.), 226–46, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0011

White, R. 2006. “Problems for Dogmatism.” Philosophical Studies 131: 525–57, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7487-9

Williams, J. and Sinhababu, N. 2015.The Backward Clock, Truth-Tracking, and Safety.” Journal of Philosophy 112: 46–55, https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil201511213

Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), https://doi.org/10.1093/019925656x.001.0001

—. 2009. “Replies to Critics.” In: P. Greenough and D. Pritchard (eds.), 279–384, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.003.0017

Wittgenstein, L. 1969. On Certainty. (Oxford: Blackwell).

Wright, C. 1985. “Facts and Certainty.” Proceedings of the British Academy 71: 429–72.

—. 1991. “Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon.” Mind 100: 87–116, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/c.397.87

—. 2002. “(Anti)-Sceptics Simple and Subtle: Moore and McDowell.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, 330–48, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00205.x

—. 2003. “Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference.” In: S. Nuccetelli (ed.), 57–78.

—. 2004. “Warrant for Nothing (And Foundations for Free?).” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78: 167–212, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00121.x

—. 2007. “The Perils of Dogmatism.” In: S. Nuccetelli and G. Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 25–48.

—. 2008. “Internal-External: Doxastic Norms and Defusing of Sceptical Paradoxes.” The Journal of Philosophy 105: 501–17, https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2008105930

—. 2011. “Frictional Coherentism? A Comment on Chapter 10 of Ernest Sosa’s Reflective Knowledge.” Philosophical Studies 153: 29–41, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9684-z

—. 2014. “On Epistemic Entitlement II: Welfare State Epistemology.” In: D. Dodd and E. Zardini (eds.), 213–47, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.003.0011

Zalabardo, J. 2005. “Externalism, Skepticism, and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.” The Philosophical Review 114: 33–61, https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-1-33