5. Self-limitation of the Moral Self as Kenosis

Chapter 5 is devoted to the dynamism of self-limitation (ziwo kanxian 自我坎陷) of the moral self—that is, a paradoxical dynamism of entanglement that produces an ontological bifurcation between the moral self and cognitive self. From the viewpoint of the self, the question is how knowing, limited egos, scattered through the multiplicity of our brains and intentionally related to an exterior world, can be produced by an all-embracing and inexhaustible moral self, and ultimately contribute to its full realization. Now we have reached the key point of Mou’s definition of the human being as a “finite being that can become infinite.” My methodological proposal is to take advantage of the centrality of space and spatial metaphors in Mou’s thought. In Chapter 3, we outlined the hodological nature of jingjie, that is, the mental landscape shaped by our effort to reach and move through it. The word kanxian, which is difficult to translate, is employed by Mou to designate the self-limitation of the moral self, and is etymologically related to “sinking” and “descending.” Furthermore, Mou affirms that the knowing self is characterized by a “curved” or “twisting” thought. This suggests that the difference between absolute and finite selves is not representable as an abyss, a catastrophic fall without return, but as an inflection, a dynamism of descent that, in its curvature, allows the possibility of a recollection and an ascensional return to the straight level of the infinite mind. To unravel the paradox of self-limitation, we should bear in mind that any dynamism can be seen from two spatial viewpoints: that of the finite self, characterized by fragmentation and dialectical opposition, and that of the moral self, which transcends fixed separations through a circular dynamism that intersects the finite world only to elevate it to the origin and source of life.

In addition to the topological interpretation, I think that another fruitful approach to the dynamism of “self-limitation” is represented by the Western-Chinese comparative approach. The reason is that Mou himself, in developing the idea of self-limitation in his later works, such as Phenomenon and Thing-in-Itself, or Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy, is constantly operating in a comparative way. In pursuing this cross-cultural contrast, I adopt the term kenosis as a frame of reference. The relevance of this concept, originally derived from theology, lies in the fact that it can indicate any process in which a higher metaphysical substance voluntarily renounces the fullness of its width and power to manifest and act on a lower plane.

The first kenotic model is presented in Hegel’s Logic and Phenomenology of the Spirit: the dialectical unfolding of the Absolute that, passing through the travail of the negative, returns progressively to itself, discovering the truth of its absoluteness concealed in the beginning. The point of maximum similarity between the Hegelian approach and that of Mou lies in their shared conception of the Absolute as subjective—that is, as an organic unfolding of life that reflexively returns to itself. Analyzing the two ways of self-limitation in Hegel, that is, alienation (Entfremdung) and exteriorization (Entäusserung), I highlight the similarities between this kenotic movement and Mou’s ziwo kanxian. In both cases, the self is not given from the beginning but realizes itself in the process of becoming. This process of self-construction requires commitment and continuous mediation with concreteness, as well as the force to transcend every partial embodiment. However, two significant differences can be observed between the Hegel and Mou groups. The first is the different consideration of horizontal finite reality, which, in Hegel, does not possess any autonomous positivity but should be continuously annihilated and conserved only in his logical truth. In Mou, finite contingences are the places of manifestation and realization of the moral mind; thus, they possess a specific ontological and metaphysical value. The separation between the cognitive ego and the world as objects of knowledge is instituted only through attachment. This temporary and illusory division in the cognitive mind must be overcome, but the concreteness of any moment should be recovered through moral action. Hegel’s dialectical self develops on a purely cognitive level, and its longing for completeness is projected toward the final stage of the Absolute Spirit. In contrast, Mou’s moral self is accomplished at every instant through concern for other beings. The vertical axis of action intersects the horizontal axis of reality. The point of intersection between the verticality of moral endeavors and the horizontality of finite things is not to be found only at the end of the process, but is a fulfillment and a truth that can take place at any instant.

The second kenotic model is offered by Emmanuel Lévinas’ (1906–1995) “philosophy of the Other” and is rooted in the kabbalistic idea of tzimtzum, that is, the voluntary self-withdrawal of God in order to free a void space in which the finite creature can autonomously consist and flourish. What appealed to Lévinas was the primacy of ethics, which seems to recall the basic tenet of Mou’s moral metaphysics. According to Lévinas, in my everyday life, I am immersed in the anonymity of being, enthralled by my search for enjoyment and self-fulfillment. The only event that can draw myself out of this circle of entrapment is the appearance of the face of another fellow human being who, in his vulnerability, draws me out of my horizon and calls me to my moral responsibility. I wake up from my selfish and dream-like plenitude only when I am attracted to this new barycenter, and I experience disruption and irreducible otherness. If we recall the Mencian example of the child about to fall in a well and the alarm and urgency shaking the roots of my being, we may notice here a common vital experience that is spontaneously produced by the appearance of the other. However, if we thoroughly analyze this experience, we may perceive a noticeable difference between Lévinas and Mou, which is based on a different idea of the self. In Lévinas, the subject is structurally centripetal and immersed in its egotistic jouissance; therefore, the disruption of radical otherness is required for me to be passively and forcibly drawn outside myself in the space of ethics. In contrast, in Mou, the human being may be immersed in the mind of habit and traverse his everyday world with the distraction of a somnambulist; however, the core of one’s being is the moral mind, which is always vigilant, living, and responsive. The innate moral consciousness that operates in my luminous core is a space for ethics. Despite the attempt to elaborate on metaphysics based on moral duty, Lévinas’ ethics remain at a cognitive level, that is, bound to an insuperable exteriority and distance between the finite self and the other. Mou’s self-limitation of the moral mind does not withdraw to let finite beings exist autonomously, as in the hypothesis of tzimtzum. Mou’s moral self accepts restraining itself, cognitively penetrating the phenomenal details of the world, and subsuming them in its action. In this way, the subject is able to fulfill its authentic nature, which is an infinite dynamic responsiveness to which nothing can be external.