This chapter sets out to develop a phenomenological method to study technology in a way that moves beyond the one-sided essentialist or ‘ontology-only’ approach developed by Heidegger, as well as the ‘empiricist’ or ‘thing-only’ approach found in postphenomeonlogy. After offering an elucidation of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology, the chapter breaks new ground on a new way of taking heed of the phenomenon of technology. It neither exclusively interprets this phenomenon as ontological ‘enactment’, pre-understanding, or Heideggerian ‘acceptio’, nor exclusively as ‘things that mediate’ like postphenomenologists would have it. Blok’s phenomenological method instead seeks to demonstrate that a pre-understanding or acceptio such as the understanding of time as linear does not occur in a free-floating way, but finds its footing or ‘founding’ in things (e.g. mechanical clocks). As a result, ontological enactment and ontic content become central to what a phenomenon is, where neither can be ‘bracketet’ or viewed as derivative. Blok does thereby not articulate the relation between enactment and content in terms of deduction or induction, where either content or enactment is prioritized. Rather, the chapter suggests that this relation must be thought as a trans-duction in order to address or ‘move across’ (trans) what is thematic and what remains non-thematic with respect to any phenomenon. Finally, the chapter explains why the proposed method bears the name of ecological hermeneutics, because if the ontological ‘acceptio’ or ‘enactment’ (e.g. linear time) is always ‘founded’ in things (e.g. mechanical clocks), things today do not just appear in the world, but explicitly appear in terms of the ecological constraints of planet Earth.